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0   How Are Fixed-term Contracts Used by Firms? 




Using Spanish establishment level data on temporary and permanent job and worker flows, 
we examine firms’ relative usage of fixed-term contracts in response to changes in their prior net 
employment expectations for the short-run and the long-run –viewed as proxies of how a wide 
variety of future shocks are ultimately perceived by establishments.  The employment response of 
establishments to changing net employment expectations for the short-run is, primarily, 
suggestive of their reliance on fixed-term contracts as a buffer to cushion short-run changes in 
demand as well as to shield permanent workers from downward workforce adjustments.  In 
contrast, their response to changes in net employment expectations for the long-run mostly hints 
on the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device.  Therefore, policies providing financial 
incentives to convert fixed-term into permanent contracts –thus targeting firms’ using fixed-term 
contracts as a screening device, are likely to only have limited effectiveness.   
 
  1I. Introduction 
During the 1980s, several countries implemented labor market reforms with the intent of 
lowering unemployment levels by deregulating employment and promoting the use of fixed-term 
contracts.
1  As opposed to open-ended or permanent work contracts, fixed-term or temporary 
work contracts provided employers with substantially lower dismissal costs.
2  These reduced 
discharge costs consisted of limited severance payments and non-existent judicial procedures 
available to workers wanting to sue employers for unfair dismissals.  From a legal point of view, 
fixed-term contracts were conceived to be used as a buffer or cushion to address temporary 
changes in employment needs due to changes in product demand characteristic of seasonal 
industries, such as tourism or construction, or to fill vacancies on a temporary basis.  However, 
in part fueled by the cost advantages described above, fixed-term contracts became widely used 
by firms for other purposes, e.g. as a buffer for workers with open-ended contracts during 
economic downturns or to screen workers for permanent positions at a relatively low cost.  In 
some instances, as was the case with Spain from 1984 to 1994, the employment regulation was 
changed to allow for the use of fixed-term contracts to hire workers fulfilling permanent jobs.  
Owing to the characteristics of the data we work with, we focus on two of the most discussed 
usages of fixed-term contracts in the labor literature, i.e. on their use as a buffer and on their use 
as a screening device. 
Spain is the most prominent case of an extensive use of fixed-term contracts and 
constitutes an unparallel example given its unprecedented growth in temporary employment, 
which grew from less than 10 percent of the wage and salary workforce in the early 1980s to 
approximately 30 percent by the second half of the 1980s (Dolado et al. 2002).  In fact, the 
                                                 
1 See Bertola and Ichino (1995) for a comparative analysis of legal reforms in Europe in the last two decades. 
  2proportion of temporary workers has barely changed since then despite the legalization of 
temporary help agencies and the passage of various labor market reforms aimed at reducing 
establishments’ reliance on temporary contracts (Toharia and Malo 2000).  Hence, there is 
growing interest in gaining a better understanding of establishments’ employment practices by 
type of work contract.   
We use Spanish data from the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL) to examine 
establishments’ employment practices by type of work contract.  The ECL is a quarterly 
longitudinal survey that contains detailed information on stocks and gross flows of workers at the 
establishment level.  Additionally, it provides information on establishments’ net employment 
expectations for the next quarter and year.  These expectations furnish detailed plant level 
information on how establishments perceive that a wide variety of short-run and long-run shocks 
may be affecting their future employment needs.  For the purpose of this study, we use data on 
establishments having 500 or more workers during the period 1/1993-1/2002
3 to first examine 
the extent to which establishments accurately forecast their short-run and long run employment 
needs by comparing their expected net employment changes for any given quarter to their 
realized gross job and worker flows.  Subsequently, we examine the dynamics of gross job and 
worker flows by type of work contract and contract conversion flows from fixed-term to 
permanent at the establishment level in response to changes in net employment expectations for 
the short-run and the long-run.  We find that establishments’ response to changing net 
employment expectations for the short-run are, primarily, suggestive of their reliance on fixed-
term contracts as a buffer to cushion short-run changes in demand as well as to shield permanent 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Throughout the paper, we will use the terms fixed-term and temporary, as well as the terms open-ended and 
permanent, interchangeably.  
3 This is the only stratum of establishments for which detailed longitudinal information on gross flows is made 
available.   
  3workers from downward workforce adjustments, whereas their response to changes in net 
employment expectations for the long-run mostly hint on the use of fixed-term contracts as a 
screening device.  
II.  Literature Review and Hypotheses to be Tested  
An extensive literature has examined the dynamics of labor demand in terms of the 
employment and worker-hours response to changes in adjustment costs.
4  However, despite the 
theoretical evidence on higher dismissal costs reducing total job reallocation and worker turnover 
rates (e.g. Blanchard and Portugal 2001), the literature does not provide a clear prediction of the 
dynamics of gross job and worker flows by type of work contract (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992).  
Focusing on Spain, García-Serrano (1998) provides some descriptive evidence on worker turnover 
and job reallocation being higher for fixed-term contracts, which account for the majority of job 
creation, job destruction, and for the difference between worker turnover rates and job reallocation 
rates (also called ‘churning’).  However, García-Serrano’s analysis displays a descriptive nature and 
is based on just two years of data (i.e. 1993 and 1994).  More importantly, this study does not 
examine establishments’ temporary and permanent job and worker flows’ dynamics in response to 
their changing employment expectations for the short-run and long run.  The link between 
establishments’ prior net employment expectations and their job and worker flows by type of 
contract reveals important information on how a variety of economic and non-economic shocks are 
perceived to affect employment at the plant level and, in turn, on how these expectations impact 
their temporary and permanent employment practices.   
However, some researchers have addressed this gap with an analysis of the impact that the 
availability of fixed-term contracts may have on the dynamics of gross job and worker flows.  For 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Hamermesh (1993) for a synthesis of this theoretical and empirical literature. 
  4instance, Goux et al. (2001) discuss how the availability of fixed-term contracts affects average 
(temporary and permanent) employment levels in France.  They argue that fixed-term contracts 
provide the firm with greater staffing flexibility.  According to the authors, low dismissal costs 
associated to fixed-term contracts allow firms to respond to short-term increases in demand through 
the hiring of temporary workers despite prospects of a future economic downturn.  Yet, Goux et al. 
(2001) do not empirically test this hypothesis regarding the use of temporary workers as a buffer.  
Other studies have done that for the U.S. and a few European countries.  For instance, Houseman 
and Abraham (1993) examine whether Japanese women are used as a buffer, and Booth et al. 
(2002) carry a similar analysis for women and ethnic minorities in the U.K.  However, possibly due 
to the difficulty of finding representative firm level data sets, these studies have relied on household 
or individual level data surveys.  As such, they cannot directly inform on the dynamics of 
establishments’ gross job and worker flows by contract type.  In fact, even when the analyses 
involve firm level data, they are restricted to specific industry analyses.  For instance, Houseman et 
al. (2001) examine whether temporary workers are used as a buffer by U.S. hospitals and firms in 
the auto supply industries.  Lastly, Varejao and Portugal (2003) address a similar question to the one 
we examine using Portuguese data of workers flows at the firm level.  They find that screening 
workers for permanent positions is by far the most important reason behind Portuguese firms’ usage 
of fixed-term contracts. 
Focusing on Spain, Jimeno and Toharia (1993a) and Bentolila and Dolado (1994) examine 
the hypothesis of temporary workers being used as a buffer, although from a collective bargaining 
point of view.  In their models, wage gaps between permanent workers –also called ‘insiders’– and 
temporary workers –or ‘outsiders’– are accentuated via collective bargaining.  In particular, the 
authors argue that permanent workers feel protected (with a very limited exposure to 
  5unemployment) in their higher salary requests by the existence of temporary workers who can be 
easily dismissed in the event of any labor adjustment needs.  As a result, according to these authors, 
salaries become relatively independent of the unemployment rate dynamics.  Hernanz (2003) has 
questioned the aforementioned models on the basis that they are only valid when workers with 
temporary and permanent workers are considered substitutes.  In contrast, if temporary workers and 
their counterparts with open-ended contracts are considered complements, both will be hired 
simultaneously, although in different proportions given the lower cost associated to fixed-term 
contracts.  Yet, a valid test of whether temporary and permanent workers are complements or 
substitutes requires information on the firm’s production function.  Finally, in a recent study, 
Polavieja (2006) argues that fixed-term contracts are mainly used as a screening device.  However, 
he recognizes that the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device does not rule out firms’ 
reliance on fixed-term contracts as a buffer or cushion to address short-term increases in demand or 
downward labor adjustments owing to fixed-term contracts’ lower dismissal costs.   
Therefore, in light of the aforementioned explanations regarding the usage of temporary 
work contracts by firms, we hypothesize that: 
a)  If temporary contracts are used as a screening device, temporary hires and job 
creation should increase (diminish) in establishments adjusting to growing (declining) employment 
expectations for the long-run.  Additionally, any contract conversion flows would signal the use of 
fixed-term contracts as a screening device.  Nonetheless, given the permanent nature of the new 
contract, changes in net employment expectations for the long-run should induce greater contract 
conversions than temporary changes in net employment expectations for the short-run.    
b)  When temporary job and worker flows are used as a buffer, any labor adjustments to 
address diminishing employment expectations are primarily carried out via changes in temporary 
  6job and worker flows.  Specifically, as formulated by Goux et al. (2001), only if temporary 
employment is used as a buffer for permanent employment will we observe that establishments 
foreseeing a decline in net employment in the long run opt to increase their temporary job or worker 
flows to accommodate their current demands while still keeping future dismissal costs low.   
Additionally, establishments’ greater reliance on fixed-term contract to address growing net 
employment expectations for the short-run also reflects their usage of temporary employment as a 
cushion or buffer against such changes.        
A priori, we do not subscribe to one particular use of temporary job and worker flows by 
firms.  After all, in large establishments, it is reasonable to expect temporary and permanent workers 
to take on a variety of responsibilities and tasks.  Furthermore, as noted by Polavieja (2006), the use 
of fixed-term contracts as a screening device by the establishment is not disputed with the use of 
temporary employment in some instances as a buffer or cushion to address changes in employment 
needs.  Since establishments’ net employment expectations can be considered proxies of how a 
wide variety of future shocks are ultimately perceived by establishments, we use changes in 
establishments’ net employment expectations for the short and long run to gauge the extent to which 
establishments use fixed-term contracts to meet their changing employment needs, drawing 
conclusions on establishments’ use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device and/or as a buffer. 
III. Institutional  Background 
Before proceeding any further, it is important to briefly review some of the institutional 
aspects of the Spanish labor market most relevant to our analysis.  Before the passage of the 
Workers’ Statute in 1980, fixed-term or temporary contracts were only allowed in sectors 
  7characterized by their seasonal employment needs under the so-called “causality principle”.
5  In 
addition, interim contracts of a temporary nature were permitted in exceptional occasions.  The 
1984 reform of the Workers’ Statute liberalized fixed-term employment introducing a new 
contract (the so-called fixed-term contract for employment promotion) that did not require the 
“causality principle”.  As such, firms could use fixed-term contracts to hire workers for all types 
of positions –temporary as well as permanent.
 6  The intent was that the introduction of this new 
contractual figure would help lower the very high unemployment rate characterizing that time 
period.  This reform increased employment flexibility at the margin by exclusively altering the 
dismissal costs of temporary contracts, while leaving the regulation of indefinite-term or 
permanent work contracts unchanged.  In part fuelled by the cost advantages of fixed-term 
contracts, temporary employment expanded very rapidly.  On the demand side, firms used fixed-
term contracts as a means to cut down employment costs.  On the supply side, youngsters relied 
on these contractual arrangements as a means to enter the labor market.  As reference of the fast 
growth of temporary employment, it is worth noting that, before the 1984 reform, approximately 
10 percent of wage and salary workers held temporary work contracts (Fina et al., 1989).  By 
1992, this proportion had grown to account for 33 per cent of wage and salary workers according 
to data from the Spanish labor force survey or Encuesta de Población Activa (Toharia and Malo, 
2000; Dolado et al., 2002).  The extended use of fixed-term contracts was only weakly linked to 
industry changes and became a common feature of all Spanish industries (Toharia 2005).   
Furthermore, temporary employment rates remained stable since the early 1990s despite 
the legalization of temporary work agencies in 1994, the passage of two labor reforms in 1994 
                                                 
5 This legal principle stated that fixed-term contracts should be exclusively used for temporary needs of the firm and 
open-ended contracts for permanent needs.  
  8and 1997 intended to reduce temporary employment rates, or the business cycle.  With regards to 
business cycles, Figure 1 depicts the evolution of temporary employment and GDP growth rates.  
Temporary employment increased between 1988 and 1992 at a time when GDP growth rates 
were slowing down.  This relationship switched sign between 1993 and 1995 and, from 1996 
onwards, temporary employment rates have remained fairly stable regardless of fluctuations in 
the growth rate of GDP.  Therefore, temporary employment rates seem to exhibit limited 
sensitivity to the business cycle.   
What about the potential impact of the two labor reforms of 1994 and 1997?  The 1994 
reform introduced two types of changes.  First, it legalized temporary work agencies –whose 
intermediation was only restricted in sectors with high injury rates, in Health Services and in the 
Public Administration.
7  Second, the 1994 legal reform tried to limit the use of fixed-term 
contracts through the restoration of the causality principle for temporary employment and the 
elimination of the fixed-term contract for employment promotion introduced in 1984.  However, 
as Toharia and Malo (2000) show, the proportion of temporary contracts remained fairly 
unchanged following the reform, even if the composition of temporary employment by type of 
contract differed.  In particular, the fixed-term contracts for employment promotion were 
replaced by the so-called per-task contracts.  Additionally, the new legislation allowed for 
‘small’ collective dismissals
8 to be treated as individual workers’ dismissals as long as they were 
based on economic grounds
9 to reduce firms’ dismissal costs.
10      
                                                                                                                                                             
6 These fixed-term contracts could not last less than 6 months or more than 3 years with the same worker.  However, 
firms were able to hire new employees using the same type of fixed-term contract to continue to cover the 
permanent position.  
7 The most extended evaluation of the impact of the temporary work agencies on the high use of temporary contracts 
in Spain concludes that, while they are not responsible for the high rate of temporary employment in Spain, they 
have shortened the duration of fixed-term contracts (Toharia, 2005). 
8 Dismissals should not involve more than 10 percent of the workforce.   
9 Economic grounds refer to relevant technological changes in the firm and, in general, to economic downturns. 
  9As the rate of temporary employment remained fairly high after the passage of the 1994 
reform, a new legal reform was implemented in 1997.  This new reform also targeted firms’ 
prominent reliance on fixed-term contracts with two new measures: (1) a new open-ended 
contract characterized by lower dismissal costs and (2) the promotion of temp-to-perm contract 
conversions through monetary incentives from the Public Administration.
11  Yet, despite all these 
institutional labor market changes, temporary employment has remained at about one third of the 
wage and salary workforce up to the present decade.
12  Since other flexible work contracts (e.g. 
part-time contracts) have been scarcely used in Spain, fixed-term contracts constitute the 
predominant work arrangement used by Spanish employers in order to increase their 
employment flexibility (Toharia, 2005).   
IV.  Data and Descriptive Analysis 
A)  Data  
The data for this research come from the Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL).  The 
ECL is a longitudinal survey carried out on a quarterly basis since the second quarter of 1990 by 
the Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.  It surveys establishments with more than five 
workers in non-agriculture industries, with the exception of Public Administration, Defense and 
Social Security, diplomatic delegations, and international and religious organizations in the 
service sector.  In 1997, the ECL underwent important methodological changes involving the 
inclusion of establishments with less than 5 workers in the survey sample along with a new 
sample stratification methodology. 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 However, the Tribunals’ interpretation of economic grounds for individual dismissals was controversial because 
of the lack of an objective definition of what constitutes an economic reason for dismissal.   
11 See Toharia and Malo (2000) for further details on these reforms. 
12 Some authors, as Dolado et al. (2002), document a smooth decline in the private sector after 1997.  In 2006, new 
political measures have been implemented following the 1997 labor market reform to curb down the high rate of 
temporary employment.   
 10We use data on establishments having more than 500 employees during the period 
1/1993-1/2002.  This is the only stratum of micro data and the only time period for which 
detailed information on establishment level gross employment flows (employment stock at the 
moment and at the end of the previous quarter, as well as the number of arrivals and separations 
by type of work contract during the quarter) has been made publicly available.  Furthermore, this 
is the only stratum of establishments unaffected by the 1997 changes to the survey methodology.  
Finally, this stratum of establishments with 500 employees constitutes the Spanish universe of 
large firms and, therefore, observations do not need to be weighted.  The number of such large 
establishments is around 1,000 in a given quarter.
13  In particular, due to new establishment 
creation, we work with an unbalanced panel consisting of 1,811 establishments and 27,381 
observations during the 1/1993-1/2002 period. 
On average, this stratum represents approximately 15 percent of non-agriculture 
employment.  About 20 percent of their workforce holds fixed-term contracts depending on the 
time period under examination (García-Serrano 1998).  Since approximately 30 percent of wage 
and salary workers hold temporary work contracts in Spain, our gross and net temporary flows 
may, in any event, be considered under-estimates of the gross and net temporary flows in the 
entire universe of Spanish establishments.  There are a couple of reasons as for why this is the 
case.  First, our sample consists of large establishments for which the percentage of workers with 
fixed-term contracts is smaller than for small and medium size establishments not included in the 
sample.  Second, for any given worker, the ECL does not record hires and separations taking place 
within the same establishment during the same month.  For instance, if a worker is hired in the first 
month of the quarter, separated in the second month, and re-hired in the third month during any 
                                                 
13 When a firm is occasionally below the threshold of 500 employees, it is maintained in our stratum and it is only 
eliminated when the firm does not recover the level of 500 employees during two additional quarters. 
 11given quarter, the ECL records two hires and one separation within that establishment during that 
quarter.  However, if a worker is hired, separated and re-hired during the same month, the ECL 
only records one hiring.  Hence, the ECL provides under-estimates of gross and net temporary 
flows of short duration.  Despite these shortcomings, the high frequency and longitudinal 
information on establishment level gross employment flows (by type of work contract) and the 
information on the establishments’ net employment expectations for the short-run and for the 
long run make the ECL a unique and well-suited survey for the analysis proposed in this study.   
B)  Gross Job and Worker Flows by Contract Type 
  Our methodology follows the empirical approach outlined in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 
1992) to construct job and worker flows.  Worker turnover (or worker reallocation) can be divided 
into two components: worker mobility due to gross job reallocation (i.e. job creation and job 
destruction processes) and worker mobility in excess of job reallocation (i.e. worker rotation or 
worker shuffling).  Because our data set contains information on hires and separations at the 
establishment level, it is possible for us to construct measures of worker reallocation and distinguish 
among its components. 
  First of all, let us consider total gross worker turnover.  Given the size of establishment i at 
times t (Ei,t) and t-1 (Ei,t-1), the average size of establishment i between t-1 and t is defined as 
follows: Ni,t = (Ei,t + Ei,t-1) / 2.  By aggregating, it is possible to obtain the size of the whole 
economy: Nt = Σi Ni,t.  The hiring (separation) rate is defined as the proportion of the number of 
workers arriving in (leaving) establishments between t-1 and t with respect to the employment 
stock:  
hi,t = Hi,t / Ni,t (si,t = Si,t / Ni,t). 
Then, by aggregating, we may calculate the aggregate hiring rate: 
 12 WPOSt = Σi (Ni,t / Nt) ⋅ hi,t
and the aggregate separation rate: 
 WNEGt = Σi (Ni,t / Nt) ⋅ si,t
The sum of both rates is the worker turnover or worker reallocation rate (WRt): 
 WRt = WPOSt + WNEGt
  Now let us consider job reallocation.  The employment growth rate in each establishment is 
defined as follows: gi,t = (Ei,t - Ei,t-1) / Ni,t = (Hi,t - Si,t) / Ni,t.  In other words, the employment growth 
rate can be calculated as the difference between current and past employment stocks, or as the 
difference between hires and separations in the corresponding period of time.
14  Then, for the whole 
economy, we can define the job creation rate as: 
 JPOSt = Σi (Ni,t / Nt) ⋅ gi,t ,        for gi,t>0 
and the job destruction rate as: 
 JNEGt = Σi (Ni,t / Nt) ⋅ ⏐gi,t⏐ ,        for gi,t<0 
The job reallocation rate (JRt) is the sum of both rates.  It provides us with an estimate of worker 
mobility due to job creation and job destruction: 
 JRt = JPOSt + JNEGt
Worker turnover (RRt) can then be defined as the extent of worker reallocation taking place in 
excess of job flows: 
 RRt = WRt - JRt = 2 ⋅ min (Ht, St) 
Finally, aggregate net employment growth rates are given by the difference between both job 
creation and job destruction rates.  They may also be computed as the difference between total hires 
and total separations.  Hence: 
 13 NETt = JPOSt - JNEGt = WPOSt - WNEGt 
Using data on the employment stock by contract type, we compute the indicators of job 
creation and job destruction for temporary, permanent, and total plant level employment.   
Similarly, we exploit the information on hires and separations by contract type at the 
establishment level to construct indicators of gross worker flows, gross temporary worker flows, 
and gross permanent worker flows.  Finally, we derive net flows for temporary, permanent, and 
total employment.  All indicators are computed in thousands.  Additionally, we compute the 
average employment stock between t and t+1 to then gauge the fraction of the adjustment made 
through changes in temporary versus permanent employment.  We thus have measures of all 
gross temporary and permanent employment flows, with total gross flows being the sum of both. 
The data base also includes information on the number of new permanent contracts 
signed with workers previously hired by the establishment on a fixed-term basis each quarter.  
Therefore, we are also able to compute conversion rates.  Such a rate is defined as  , with 
the only difference that   now refers to these new permanent contracts instead of all new 
permanent contracts.  Finally, it is worth noting that new permanent contracts resulting from 
contract conversions are included in the calculation of permanent hires in the same way that the 
fixed-term contracts converted to a permanent basis are considered temporary employment 
separations.  Otherwise, these permanent and temporary worker flows would be miscalculated. 
t WPOS
t i h ,
C)  Net Employment Expectations and Gross Job and Worker Flows by Contract Type
The main purpose of this study is to learn about how establishments adjust their temporary 
and permanent job and worker flows to fluctuations in their future employment needs as captured 
by changes in their prior net employment expectations.  Therefore, we create two sets of 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 In both instances, this growth rate provides us with insights on the establishment’s net job creation or destruction rate. 
 14dichotomous variables to capture establishments’ net employment expectations for the following 
quarter and for the following year.  These dummies are created using the responses of 
establishments’ human resource and personnel departments when asked whether they expect their 
employment stock to increase, remain unchanged, or decrease in the short-run (next quarter) and in 
the long run (next year).  In particular, establishments’ human resource and personnel departments 
are asked to “Indicate the foreseen employment changes for the following two time periods: (a) for 
the upcoming trimester, that is, between the first and last days of the upcoming trimester, and (b) for 
the upcoming year, that is, between the first and last days of the upcoming twelve months”.  Survey 
respondents then choose among three options regarding their expected future net employment: 
increasing (se aumentará), unchanged (permanecerá estable) and diminishing (disminuirá).  
Because the survey universe consists of large establishments with 500 plus workers, human 
resource and personnel departments are typically well informed and, in any case, assisted by the 
statistical survey team in interpreting and answering the questions posed by the professional 
interviewers.  Furthermore, to the extent that the information on establishments’ net employment 
expectations is used on a quarterly basis by the Ministry of Labor to publicize industries’ 
employment outlooks, establishments’ responses to this question are carefully checked across 
quarters to ensure data reliability.     
Past research has used industry or regional information regarding changes in sales, 
shipments, output prices or other observable shocks to gauge changes in labor demand (e.g. 
Hamermesh 1993).  In this study, we make use of information on establishments’ net 
employment expectations for the upcoming quarter and year.  As the term indicates, these 
expectations do not exclusively reflect a frictionless target but, rather, expected changes in the 
employment needs of the establishment given its adjustment costs and overall human resource 
                                                                                                                                                             
See, for example, Davis et al. (1996), chapter 2. 
 15strategy.  Because of the lack of information on establishments’ adjustment costs or human 
resource strategies, most studies using measures of observable shocks run into an omitted 
variable problem that biases their estimate of the establishment’s reaction to the shock.  In this 
regard, the usage of individualized information on establishments’ net employment expectations 
for the upcoming quarter and year constitutes an ideal measure to address a related, yet slightly 
different, question we pose ourselves in this study.  The latter refers to establishments’ 
employment practices vary by type of work contract and, in particular: to which extent do 
establishments use temporary employment as a screening device and/or as a buffer when 
adjusting to their changing net employment expectations?  Additionally, the usage of 
establishments’ net employment expectations for the upcoming quarter and year provides some 
advantages over more conventional measures of observable shocks.  First, instead of proxying 
for changes in labor demand via changes in sales, shipments, or output prices, establishments’ 
net employment expectations directly capture how a variety of shocks are ultimately perceived 
by plants as reflected by their expectations regarding future employment needs.  Second, survey 
data provide us with information regarding changes in establishments’ net employment 
expectations for the short-run and the long-run.  In this manner, we are able to distinguish how 
establishments rely on specific contract types depending on the temporal proximity of the 
expected change in their employment needs.  Third, establishments’ net employment 
expectations are measured at the establishment level instead of at the industry or regional level.  
As such, they constitute a more valuable measure considering that establishments may respond 
differently to future shocks depending on the accuracy of their information and their economic 
standing. 
 16Table 1 displays average gross job and worker flows according to the sign of 
establishments’ net employment expectations for the next quarter and year.
15  For the most part, 
employment expectations are met with temporary and permanent employment adjustments of the 
same sign.  This is particularly true in the short-run.  For instance, establishments seem to 
respond to increasing net employment expectations from a previous quarter by expanding their 
temporary and permanent workforces by 37 and 8 workers per one thousand, respectively.   
Likewise, diminishing net employment expectations from a previous quarter are met with 
reductions in both temporary and permanent employment of 6 and 11 workers per one thousand, 
correspondingly.  As such, fixed-term contracts seem to be used as a shock absorber or buffer in 
the short-run, particularly to respond to growing net employment expectations.  Additional 
evidence of the usage of temporary employment as a buffer is provided by the fact that net 
temporary employment is positive for establishments with unchanged or with diminishing net 
employment expectations for the long-run.  This statistic supports the predictions from the 
dynamic labor demand model presented by Goux et al. (2001), who argue that establishments 
will continue to hire temporary workers in the presence of a long-run economic downturn in 
order to satisfy current demand as they will be able to use them as a buffer for permanent 
employees at a future date.   
Is there any evidence of the usage of temporary employment as a screening device?  Yes.  
The simultaneous use of fixed-term and permanent contracts to address both growing as well as 
diminishing net employment expectations for the short-run is suggestive of the usage of fixed-
term contracts as a screening device.  Additional evidence regarding the use of fixed-term 
contracts to screen workers is provided by establishments’ conversion flows.  The ratio of 
permanent hires to conversions remains at about 2.5 regardless of the change in net employment 
                                                 
15 Gross job and worker flows indicators are computed at the establishment level. 
 17expectations.  The sole exception occurs when establishments adjust to diminishing employment 
expectations for the next year, in which case this rate rises to approximately 3.6 as fewer temp-
to-perm contract conversions take place.  The relatively stable proportionality between 
permanent hires and conversion flows is suggestive of the usage of fixed-term contracts as a 
screening device, possibly as part of the establishments’ long-run employment strategies.   
  In sum, establishments seem to primarily rely on temporary employment flows to meet 
increases in their net employment expectations as would be expected if firms use fixed-term 
contracts as a shock absorber or buffer.  Likewise, establishments increase their temporary 
employment when they are either uncertain or expect a decline in their future net employment –both 
signs of establishments’ possible reliance on temporary employment as a buffer for permanent 
employment.  However, establishments also raise their net permanent employment to meet growing 
net employment expectations, suggesting that fixed-term and open-ended contracts are used in a 
complementary manner by some firms as would be the case when fixed-term contracts are used as a 
screening device.         
V. Empirical  Methodology 
Our main purpose is to learn about establishments’ employment practices by type of work 
contract and, specifically, assess the extent to which establishments use temporary employment 
as a screening device and/or as a buffer when adjusting to their changing net employment 
expectations.  In modeling establishments’ temporary and permanent net employment, gross job 
and worker flows, and temp-to-perm contract conversions, we account for a variety of variables 
possibly influencing establishments’ employment practices ranging from general establishment 
characteristics to institutional and macroeconomic controls.   
 18In the first category of general establishment descriptors, we include information 
regarding the establishment size, industry and sector.  Smaller establishments may be more likely 
to rely on temporary workers as a means to respond to changes in their product demand or 
financial constraints.
16  Likewise, establishments in certain industries, such as services, and 
sectors, as is the case with the private sector, experience a higher volume of job and worker 
rotation.  In addition to the aforementioned establishment level characteristics, we account for 
various institutional aspects, such as the presence and scope of a collective bargaining agreement 
due to its potential impact on the establishment’s employment practices.
17  Finally, we 
incorporate regional dichotomous variables as well as quarterly and yearly dummies.  The 
regional dummies allow us to take into account changes in the economic and institutional 
environment in which establishments operate, as in the case of regional economic booms/crises 
or variations in payroll taxes/subsidies.  Additionally, we incorporate year and quarter dummies 
to purge our estimated coefficients from the impact of nationwide labor market reforms and 
seasonal fluctuations in establishments’ job and worker flows, respectively.  A description of the 
variables used in our regression analysis, along with their means and standard deviations, is 
provided in Table A in the appendix.   
  Given the longitudinal nature of our dataset, the aforementioned discussion suggests the 
following panel data model: 
(1)  it i i it it Z X y ε µ δ β + + + =  
                                                 
16 Establishments’ size is lagged one period in order to guarantee its predetermined character.   
17 Due to the institutional framework of Spanish collective bargaining, collective agreements extend to any 
establishment of the sector.  Therefore, the relevant distinction is not whether or not there is a collective agreement 
applicable to the establishment’s employees but, rather, the scope of the collective agreement in place.  See, for 
example, Jimeno and Toharia (1993b) or García-Serrano and Malo (2002) for greater details on collective 
bargaining in Spain. 
 19where  yit represents the ratio of temporary to permanent gross job and worker flows being 
examined;  Xit is a vector of time-varying characteristics –including the establishment’s net 
employment change expectations, lagged size, internal collective bargaining, industry, and other 
establishments’ size and workforce composition– and sets of dummies for each quarter in our 
sample;  Zi  is a vector including information on time-invariant characteristics of the 
establishments in our sample, such as their location and whether they belong to the public sector; 
µi is the unobserved establishment specific and time invariant effect, assumed to have zero mean, 
finite variance  , and to be identically distributed (i.i.d.) over the panel; and ε
2
υ σ it is the 
idiosyncratic error, also assumed to have zero mean, finite variance  , and to be i.i.d. over all 
the observations in our panel.   
2
e σ
  To determine whether unobserved plant level fixed characteristics should be modeled as 
fixed-effects or random-effects, we examine whether µi is uncorrelated with other explanatory 
variables in our model.  If the unobserved establishment-specific effect is potentially correlated 
with some explanatory variables, the fixed-effects method is needed since the use of random-
effects would yield inconsistent estimates.  Both the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
and the Hausman specification tests suggest the specification of the individual effects to be 
fixed.
18  Hence, we estimate equation (1) via OLS as a fixed-effect model and, in this manner, 
we obtain consistent and efficient estimates of β and δ.   
VI. Results 
A)  Net Employment Expectations and Temporary to Permanent Job and Worker Flows
  Table 2 displays the estimates from the fixed-effects regression analysis of the ratios of 
temporary to permanent gross job and worker flows.  In particular, columns 1 and 2 present the 
 20es es for the ratios of temporary to permanent job creation and job destruction rates, columns 
3 and 4 show the estimates for the ratios of temporary to permanent hires and separation rates, 
and the last column (column 5) presents the estimates corresponding to the ratio of temporary to 
permanent net employment change at the establishment level.  
  The results displayed in Table 2 are supportive of the hypothesis that establishments use 
fixed-term contracts with screening purposes as well as a buff
timat
er.  Specifically, the positive sign 
ffer to meet other changes in establishments’ 
ploy
ing 
                                                                                                                                                            
on establishments’ prior employment growth expectations for the long-run when examining 
ratios of temporary to permanent job creation flows signals that establishments create nearly 37 
percent more temporary than permanent positions when envisioning a long-run growth period.  
This behavior is suggestive of establishments using temporary work contracts as a screening 
device to meet long-run employment needs.   
  However, the figures in Table 2 also provide some evidence of the usage of temporary 
work contracts as a shock absorber or bu
em ment expectations.  For instance, the positive signs on establishments’ prior employment 
growth expectations for the short-run when examining the ratios of temporary to permanent job 
creation flows are indicative of their greater reliance on temporary employment to meet short-run 
changes in their product demand and other immediate employment needs.  Similarly, the fact that 
establishments respond to diminishing employment expectations for the long-run by creating 
temporary positions at more than twice the rate of permanent positions suggests, once more, their 
partial usage of temporary contracts as a buffer that allows them to avoid the future costly 
dismissal of permanent employees, according to Goux et al.’s prediction (Goux et al., 2001). 
  Also signaling the usage of temporary contracts as a shock absorber or buffer is the 
change in the ratio of temporary to permanent job destruction among establishments fac
 
18 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
 21em ment growth and employment decline expectations in the short-run.  Establishments are 
significantly less likely to destroy temporary (relative to permanent) positions when faced with 
employment growth expectations for the short-run.  However, establishments destroy temporary 
positions at two and a half the rate that they destroy permanent positions when addressing 
diminishing employment expectations for the short-run.   
  Yet another sign of the usage of fixed-term contracts as a shock absorber or buffer is the 
fact that establishments are six times more likely (and fou
ploy
r times less likely) to hire workers on a 
mpor
 flows to prior changes in net employment expectations for the short-
te ary (as compared to a permanent) basis when faced with employment growth (decline) 
expectations, which hints that temporary hiring is primarily used by firms to meet short-run 
increases in demand.         
  Finally, the last column of Table 2 displays the response of the ratio of temporary to 
permanent net employment
run.  Because net employment flows are the sum of all job/worker flows –whether positive or 
negative– this ratio signals establishments’ relative adjustments in temporary (as compared to 
permanent) employment when faced with changing net employment expectations.  In this regard, 
it is interesting to note that adjustments in temporary employment are about three times greater 
than adjustments in permanent employment when establishments address diminishing 
employment expectations.  This behavior is suggestive of the use of fixed-term contracts as a 
buffer for workers with permanent contracts.  However, temporary employment adjustments are 
about three times smaller than adjustments in permanent employment when establishments face 
employment growth expectations.  If temporary contracts were being used as a buffer, we would 
expect the opposite, i.e. greater temporary employment adjustments when establishments 
respond to short-run growing employment expectations (perhaps resulting from the hiring of new 
 22temporary workers to address the short-run increases in demand).  Instead, it seems as if 
establishments use their temporary work contracts with screening purposes and do not bother to 
make substantial changes to their temporary workforce in the face of what they envision as only 
short-run changes in their employment expectations.  Consequently, the response of temporary to 
permanent net employment flows provides mixed evidence of the potential uses of fixed-term 
contracts by establishments.     
  In sum, establishments do not seem to use fixed-term contracts with just one purpose.  
Instead, the response of establishments to changing net employment expectations for the short-
 of temporary employment 
is rela
run is mainly suggestive of their reliance on fixed-term contracts as a shock absorber or buffer, 
whereas their response to changes in net employment expectations for the long-run mostly 
alludes to their usage of fixed-term contracts as a screening device.    
Finally, it is also worth noticing that, the ratio of temporary to permanent job creation is 
smaller among larger sized establishments suggesting that the creation
tively more frequent among smaller sized establishments.  However, the ratios of 
temporary to permanent job destruction, job separations and, as such, the sum of temporary to 
permanent flows, are all greater among larger establishments.  It is also interesting to note that 
the presence of collective bargaining at the firm level significantly raises the ratio of temporary 
to permanent job creation, job destruction, hires, and, overall, net employment flows.  This effect 
confirms the reduced fluctuations in permanent employment often observed in the presence of 
unions and employment protection measures.  Finally, establishments’ ratios of temporary to 
permanent job and worker flows do not seem to vary much by industry.  The only exception are 
the relatively smaller ratios of temporary to permanent net employment flows in the construction 
industry compared to more seasonal industries in the tourism and alike services.      
 23B)  Net Employment Expectations and Temporary to Permanent Contract Conversions 
  Another means to gain a better understanding of how establishments make use of 
por   This 
ing (diminishing) employment 
expecta
tive bargaining at the firm level.  Permanent workers, also 
called the “insiders” in the collective bargaining literature (e.g. Jimeno and Toharia 1993a, 
tem ary work contracts is to examine their temporary to permanent contract conversions.
analysis not only informs on the usage of fixed-term contracts as a screening device but, also, on 
how  temp-to-perm contract conversions are affected by changes in establishments’ net 
employment expectations for the upcoming quarter and year.   
According to the figures in Table 3, establishments decrease (increase) their temporary to 
permanent contract conversions when faced with grow
tions for the short-run.  Why?  It is possible that, if establishments do not use fixed-term 
contracts as a shock absorber or buffer, they may not increase their temporary job creation and 
hires to address employment growth expectations that they envision as temporary.  Instead, it is 
possible that establishments view fixed-term contracts as a screening device.  Therefore, any 
temp-to-perm contract conversions constitute employment practices with long-term effects.   
Under such scenario, establishments may not alter their contract conversions in the face of what 
are viewed as short-run or temporary diminishing employment expectations.  Additional 
evidence of the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device stems from the fact that 
establishments increase (decrease) their temporary to permanent contract conversions by 
approximately one contract per quarter to adjust to employment growth (decline) expectations 
for the long-run.  In sum, these findings suggest that some establishments use fixed-term 
contracts as a screening device.     
  Finally, it is worth discussing the lower temporary to permanent contract conversion rates 
among establishments with collec
 24Bentolila and Dolado 1994), typically have more clout in any agreements reached at the firm 
level than temporary workers.  Therefore, any collective bargaining agreement at the firm level is 
more likely to ensure, first, better working conditions for permanent workers.  The latter may, in 
some instances, come at the cost of allowing for the use of temporary work contracts as a shock 
absorber or buffer (resulting in fewer contract conversions) to cut labor costs when faced with a 
downturn (as, for example, Bentolila and Dolado, 1994, alleged in their theoretical model).   
Finally, industry-wise, the results indicate that establishments in the finance and insurance 
industries are less likely to use temporary work contracts as a screening device than other 
establishments in the service industry. 
VII. Conclusions 
Previous theoretical (Goux et al., 2001) as well as empirical work (García-Serrano, 1998) 
has stressed the importance of distinguishing between fixed-term and open-ended work contracts 
 employment practices.  The literature also recognizes a variety of ways 
in whic
when examining firms’
h firms use temporary employment.  In this paper, we focus on two of the most salient 
and discussed uses in the literature on fixed-term employment: (a) the use of fixed-term contracts 
as a buffer to cushion short-run changes in demand as well as to shield permanent workers from 
downward workforce adjustments, and (b) the usage of fixed-term contracts as a screening 
device.  Using gross job and worker flows data on Spanish establishments, we examine 
establishments’ employment practices by type of work contract and discuss the extent to which 
establishments use temporary employment as a screening device or as a buffer when adjusting to 
changes in prior employment expectations.  Establishments’ prior employment expectations 
provide us with detailed plant level information on how a wide variety of short-run and long-run 
 25shocks are ultimately perceived by establishments as reflected by changes in their expectations 
regarding future employment needs. 
Using data from Spain, the country with the highest rate of temporary employment in the 




uffer.  However, the use of fixed-term contracts as a buffer seems to be the most prominent 
es.  On one hand, establishments seem to rely on fixed-term contracts as a buffer to meet 
expected short-run changes in employment needs.  Some examples of this behavior are 
establishments’ greater temporary to permanent job creation and hiring ratios when responding 
to employment growth expectations for the short-run; yet, the also greater rate at which they 
destroy temporary positions when faced with diminishing employment expectations for the 
short-run.  On the other hand, establishments also appear to create temporary jobs at a higher rate 
than permanent jobs to address long-run employment growth expectations, which hints on the 
usage of fixed-term contracts as a screening device to satisfy long-term employment needs.   
We also look closely at establishments’ temporary to permanent contract conversions to 
better understand their determinants.  We find that, not surprisingly, conversions are more (l
o occur following employment growth (decline) expectations for the long-run, whereas 
the opposite occurs in the presence of changes in establishments’ prior employment expectations 
for the short-run.  That is, establishments continue to convert fixed-term contracts to permanent 
when adjusting to diminishing employment expectations for the short-run –perhaps owing to 
their temporary nature.  In contrast, they are not likely to go forward with temporary to 
permanent contract conversions when facing employment growth expectations for just the short-
run. 
In sum, establishments appear to use fixed-term contracts both as a screening device and 
as a b
 26when r
likely to have a limited 
effectiv
esponding to changing net employment expectations for the short-run.  In contrast, the 
response of establishments to changes in net employment expectations for the long-run is mainly 
suggestive of their usage of fixed-term contracts as a screening device.   
What policy implications stem from these findings?  Most notably, policies consisting of 
financial incentives to convert fixed-term into permanent contracts are 
eness when firms also use fixed-term contracts as a buffer.  At any rate, the possibility 
still exists that establishments’ response to changing employment expectations in small and 
medium size establishments not included in our sample differs from that observed in large 
establishments.  While the literature (e.g. Davis et al.  Chapter 4, 1996) has shown that gross 
flows are mainly driven by the behavior of large firms, the availability of detailed employment 
stock and flow data for small and medium size establishments should prove useful in furthering 
our understanding of establishments’ employment practices by type of work contract.   
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Table 1 
Gross Flows by Contract Type and by Establishments’ Net Employment Expectations  
(All figures in per thousands) 
 











Increasing        50.41  12.96 247.93 210.48  37.45 - 
Unchanged           
           
22.30 15.33 139.54 132.56 6.98 - 
Diminishing 13.64 19.78 65.03 71.17 -6.14 - 











Increasing        12.81  4.80 23.36 15.35  8.01 9.04 
Unchanged           
             
6.06 6.88 14.16 14.98 -0.82 5.36 
Diminishing 6.23 16.88 11.89 22.55 -10.66 4.24











Increasing        90.83  18.07 932.13 859.37  72.76 - 
Unchanged           
           
52.11 20.37 551.48 519.75 31.73 - 
Diminishing 24.29 12.64 184.06 172.41 11.65 - 











Increasing        32.86  14.03 84.62 65.79  18.84 37.16 
Unchanged         
           
18.35 20.69 56.81 59.15 -2.34  21.97 
Diminishing 8.27 49.87 31.68 73.28 -41.60 8.68 
Source: Authors’ tabulations using the ECL. 
Note: Gross flows are measured following Davis-Haltiwanger methodology as explained in the main text.  (*) ‘Conversions’ refers to 
permanent hires proceeding from immediately previous temporary contracts with the same workers. By definition, the amount of conversions 
is as much as permanent hires.Table 2 
Fixed Effects Estimates of Ratios of Quarterly Temporary to Permanent Gross Job and Worker Flows  
(S.E. in Parentheses) 
 
Independent Variables  Job Creation  Job Destruction Hires Separations  Net  Employment
Expectations for Next Quarter 
Increasing 1.951*** -2.451*** 6.157***  -4.620  -2.680*** 
(0.756) (0.393) (1.870) (2.896)  (0.537) 
Diminishing 0.500 2.651***  -3.713*  1.883  3.279*** 
(1.180) (0.367) (2.191) (3.198)  (0.595) 
Expectations for Next Year        
Increasing 1.372* -0.664  2.810  -1.690  0.421 
(0.798) (0.409) (1.968) (3.058)  (0.567) 
Diminishing 2.304* -0.663 -0.199 -0.526  -0.335 
(1.270) (0.497) (2.386) (3.494)  (0.646) 
Establishment Characteristics        
Establishment Size at (t-1)  -0.175**  0.402***  0.213  0.628**  0.123** 
(0.072) (0.035) (0.170) (0.270)  (0.050) 
Collective Bargaining at firm level 2.313**  1.072**  4.443*  5.715  1.136* 
(1.013) (0.459) (2.293) (3.555)  (0.664) 
Energy -5.743 1.531  -16.072**  -2.527  -1.588 
(4.743) (1.271) (7.789)  (11.231) (2.112) 
Chemicals, Rubber, Plastics -0.596  1.597  -14.511  -1.037  0.052 
(5.632) (1.444) (9.134)  (12.783) (2.429) 
Machinery 4.025 2.029  -10.108  -1.055  1.632 
(4.187) (1.253) (7.647)  (10.847) (2.035) 
Other Manufacturing -0.214  1.123  -9.869  -0.353  -0.672 
(3.908) (1.034) (6.373) (9.139)  (1.727) 
Construction -4.231 2.161 -4.559 -2.512 -5.218* 
(5.349) (1.708)  (10.030)  (14.999) (2.776) 
Trade 0.998 1.334 -4.230  -4.199 -0.614 
(2.891) (0.974) (5.644) (8.275)  (1.540) 
Transportation  &  Communications -0.979 -0.597 -3.222 2.521  -1.566 
(2.423) (0.704) (4.410) (6.241)  (1.156) 
Finance & Insurance -0.001  0.304  -3.531  -0.837  0.982 
(1.856) (0.661) (3.653) (5.570)  (1.034) 
Regression Fit Statistics        
No. Of Observations 8466  16212 21414 24759  24678 
Number of Groups 1509 1664 1744 1772  1781 
F statistic 4.67 13.09 5.16  2.08  4.14 
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0012  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes:  ***indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, **indicates significance at the 5 percent level, and 
*indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  The regressions include a constant term as well as dummies for each quarter 
in our sample.  Unchanged employment expectations and ‘other services’ are used as reference categories. Gross flows used 
to construct the ratios are measured following Davis-Haltiwanger methodology as explained in the main text. 
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Table 3 
 Fixed Effects Estimates of Quarterly Gross “Temp-to-Perm” Contract Conversion Flows (S.E. in Parentheses)  
 
Independent Variables  Temp-to-Perm Conversions 










Establishment Characteristics   
Establishment Size at (t-1)  0.023 
(0.032) 














Transportation & Communications -0.002 
(0.751) 
Finance & Insurance -1.496** 
(0.675) 
Regression Fit Statistics   
No. Of Observations 29345 
Number of Groups 1858 
F statistic 6.24 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Notes: ***indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level, **indicates significance at the 5 percent level, and 
*indicates significance at the 10 percent level.  The regressions include a constant term as well as dummies for each quarter 
in our sample.  Unchanged employment expectations and ‘other services’ are used as reference categories. Gross flows are 




















Temp. Rate (left) GDP Growth Rate (right)
 
Source: Labor Force Survey and National Accounts. 
Figure 1 
Temporary Employment and GDP Growth Rates Table A 
Description, Means, and Standard Deviations 
 
Variables Description  Mean  S.D. 
Ratios of Quarterly Flows by Contract Type  
JPOSRATIO  Establishment’s ratio of quarterly temp to perm job creation flows  5.9067  23.6145 
JNEGRATIO Establishment’s ratio of quarterly temp to perm job destruction flows  2.5828  13.4375 
WPOSRATIO  Establishment’s ratio of quarterly temp to perm hires  24.0556  112.7021 
WNEGRATIO  Establishment’s ratio of quarterly temp to perm separations  17.7020  150.2000 
WNETRATIO  Establishment’s ratio of quarterly temp to perm net employment flows  0.3078  26.3056 
Establishment’s quarterly temp to perm contract conversion flows  1.4889 9.4991 
Expectations for Next Quarter 
Increasing   Dummy variable indicative of increasing net employment 
expectations for the next quarter  0.1497 0.3568 
Unchanged  Dummy variable indicative of unchanged net employment 
expectations for the next quarter  0.6983 0.4590 
Diminishing  Dummy variable indicative of diminishing net employment 
expectations for the next quarter  0.1489 0.3560 
Expectations for Next Year      
Increasing   Dummy variable indicative of increasing net employment 
expectations for the next year  0.1461 0.3532 
Unchanged  Dummy variable indicative of unchanged net employment 
expectations for the next year  0.7179 0.4500 
Diminishing  Dummy variable indicative of diminishing net employment 
expectations for the next year  0.1360 0.3428 
Other Establishment Characteristics 
Establishment Size at (t-1)   Establishment’s size last quarter in hundreds of workers  12.5883 15.0206 
Collective Bargaining  Establishment-level collective bargaining dummy  0.3882 0.4874 
Energy Industry  dummy  0.0342 0.1818 
Chemicals, Rubber, Plastics  Industry dummy  0.0412 0.1988 
Machinery Industry dummy  0.1170 0.3214 
Other Manufacturing  Industry dummy  0.0494 0.2166 
Construction Industry  dummy  0.0162 0.1262 
Trade Industry  dummy  0.0909 0.2874 
Transportation & Comm.  Industry dummy  0.0833 0.2764 
Finance & Insurance  Industry dummy  0.0749 0.2632 
Other Services  Industry dummy  0.4640 0.4987 
Source: Authors’ tabulations using the ECL. 
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